France-Japan Workshop on “Disagreement in Logic and Reasoning” and a Special Session on “A Humanity and Social Science Approach to Cybersecurity Research: An EU Horizon 2020 Project”
PROGRAM
Part 1 France-Japan Workshop on “Disagreement in Logic and Reasoning”
9:45-9:50 Opening
9:50-10:50 Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1),“so-called relativist logic, its purpose and its limits”
11:50-11:00 Break
11:00-11:40 Hirohiko Abe (Guest Independent Researcher), “Deep Disagreement and Sentimentalist Epistemology”
11:40-12:20 Introduction of the Presentations of the March Paris Meetings
Onyu Mikami (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
“Elucidating others’ concepts — Towards mutual understanding beyond translation —”
Yuichiro Hosokawa (Gunma Prefectural Women's University)
“Disagreement Among Analyses of Counterfactuals”
Ryo Ito (Waseda University)
“Expression, Extension, and Disagreement about rules”
Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
“How to Spell Out Implicit Logical Dependencies”
Mitsuhuro Okada (Keio University)
“New roles of contexts and syntactic interpretations in the traditional logical disputes”
12:20-13:30 Lunch Break
13:30-14:30 Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1), “Disagreement in language and disagreement in ethics”
14:30-14:40 Break
14:40-15:30 Yasushi Hirai (Keio University) Special Guest Speaker, “Philosophy Navigating the Boundaries: Case Studies in Bergsonian Research”
15:30-15:35 Break
15:35-16:15 Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University), “Kant's Theory of Concept Formation: Definitions, Expansions, and the Role of Experience”
Break 16:15-16:25
Part 2 Cybersecurity Session with the DEMOSERIES EU Project Team--Shaping Democratic Spaces: Security and TV Series
16:25-16:30 Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University), “Coordinator’s Introduction on the humanity science-driven studies on security of our life in cyber space”
16:30-16:35 Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1), “Introducing the DEMOSERIES
16:35-17:20 Thibaut de Saint Maurice (Université Paris-1), “Defying imagination, How to represent cybersecurity stakes in film and tv series”
17:20-17:35 Discussion Session 1
17:35-18:20 Sylvie Allouche (Lyon Catholic University and Université Paris-1), “Metaphors of cybersecurity: a few issues”
18:20-18:35 Discussion Session 2
18:35 Closing
Organizing Committee
Yuichiro Hosokawa (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University)
Ryo Ito (Waseda University)
Onyu Mikami (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Koji Mineshima (Keio University)
Mitsuhiro Okada (Keio University)
Kengo Okamoto (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Coordinators
Hirohiko Abe
Mitsuhiro Okada
Host Organization
慶應義塾大学論理と感性のグローバル研究センタ
Global Research Center for Logic and Sensitivity, Keio University
ABSTRACTS
Jocelyn Benoist (Université Paris-1), “so-called relativist logic, its purpose and its limits”
TBA
Hirohiko Abe (Guest Independent Researcher), “Deep Disagreement and Sentimentalist Epistemology”
Robert Fogelin introduced the notion of deep disagreements, which are disagreements on framework propositions. He also argued that in deep disagreements, arguments are pointless and rational resolution is impossible. According to Drew Johnson, intellectual humility provides a non-rational yet constructive approach to resolving deep disagreements. Being epistemically humble enables one to be open to changing their worldviews and to reduce their confidence in their fundamental commitments. In this talk, I expand Johnson’s idea from the viewpoint of sentimentalist epistemology, which posits that emotion is essentially involved in epistemic justification. I argue that intellectual humility involves being receptive to people with different perspectives and being ready to initiate arguments. Intellectual humility not only opens up the possibility of changing one’s worldview but also enables the exchange of reasons. Furthermore, I argue that an epistemic community that emphasizes intellectual humility as its core norm holds intrinsic epistemic value.
Sandra Laugier (Université Paris-1), “Disagreement in language and disagreement in ethics”
Wittgenstein speaks about an 'agreement in language' and in form of life (PI 241-242). It is of the first importance that Wittgenstein says that we agree in and not e.g. on language. That means that we are not agents of the agreement, that language precedes agreement just as much as agreement makes language possible, and that this circularity amounts to an irreducible skepticism. As Cavell puts it, “we cannot have agreed beforehand to all that would be necessary”. The question of language agreement and disagreement in "what we say" becomes ethical.
Yasushi Hirai (Keio University), “Philosophy Navigating the Boundaries: Case Studies in Bergsonian Research”
TBA
Ryosuke Igarashi (Kyoto University), “Kant's Theory of Concept Formation: Definitions, Expansions, and the Role of Experience”
This presentation focuses on the theory of concept formation as developed in Kant's transcendental logic. The theory of concept formation deals with how we acquire and expand "concepts" through experiences, among other means. While Kant himself did not use the term "concept formation," recent scholars have extensively discussed Kant's contributions to this area (cf. Anderson 2015; Vanzo 2017; Wang 2021; McAndrew 2021, 2022). The growing interest in Kant's theory of concept formation is attributed to its relevance to formal logic, as it addresses the form and structure of "concepts," to epistemology, as it deals with the acquisition and expansion of concepts that are central to cognition, and methodology, as it relates to the conditions that lead our cognition to a complete system, as will be clarified in this presentation. In other words, the perspective of concept formation provides a unified viewpoint that runs through Kant's entire theoretical philosophy. Furthermore, the theory of concept formation has formed an intellectual tradition stretching from Hegel and Lotze to Cassirer and even Max Weber. Therefore, interpreting Kant's theoretical philosophy from the standpoint of concept formation has significant implications for its historical significance. Previous discussions on Kant's theory of concept formation have primarily focused on acquiring concepts through abstraction or expanding concepts based on the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. This presentation, however, will focus on Kant's theory of definition as developed mainly in the Critique of Pure Reason and his lectures on logic. In the "Transcendental Methodology" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant mentions the definition of concepts in the context of contrasting mathematics and philosophy, noting that empirical concepts can never have a complete definition. This implies that the definitions of our empirical concepts remain imperfect and provisional, subject to change and modification through experience. Considering this point, this presentation will present a model of concept formation in Kant's theoretical philosophy. Here, the workings of our concept formation are understood as a dynamic activity where the acquisition and modification of (imperfect) definitions of concepts and the expansion of concepts through synthetic judgments interact within the realm of experience.
Thibaut de Saint Maurice (Université Paris-1), “Defying imagination, How to represent cybersecurity stakes in film and tv series”
For the traditional threats of war and even the more informal threats of espionage or terrorism, the fiction of recent years has provided us with common, shared representations. But when it comes to cyber threats, we are sorely lacking in common, shared representations. How do we represent cyber threats and cyber security responses when they occur on the edge of reality? How can we ensure that cyber security is not confiscated by a group of experts? My point would be to think how film and tv series can be a ressource to educate the audiences about cybersecurity stakes especially in creating an imaginary about very technical process. The power and precision of this imaginary world is therefore essential if cybersecurity is to reach a wide audience and become part of the democratic conversation.
Sylvie Allouche (Lyon Catholic University and Université Paris-1), “Metaphors of cybersecurity: a few issues”
Contrary to a simplistic view sometimes conveyed of science and technology as the exclusive realm of reason, they often resort to metaphors, which enable actors to better grasp their objects, but also sometimes constitute "epistemological obstacles" (Gaston Bachelard). Yet the field of cybersecurity is particularly fertile in terms of metaphors, not only when represented in popular culture, but also in the discourse of cybersecurity itself. I propose to examine a few issues of this phenomenon.